FUNDAMENTALNAYA I PRIKLADNAYA MATEMATIKA

(FUNDAMENTAL AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS)

2007, VOLUME 13, NUMBER 2, PAGES 147-155

Equilibrium and Pareto-optimality in noisy discrete duels with an arbitrary number of actions

L. N. Positselskaya

Abstract

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We study a nonzero-sum game of two players that is a generalization of the antagonistic noisy duel of discrete type. The game is considered from the point of view of various criteria of optimality. We prove the existence of $\epsilon$-equilibrium situations and show that the $\epsilon$-equilibrium strategies that we found are $\epsilon$-maxmin. Conditions under which the equilibrium plays are Pareto-optimal are given.

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Last modified: May 23, 2007