FUNDAMENTALNAYA
I PRIKLADNAYA MATEMATIKA

(FUNDAMENTAL AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS)

2007, VOLUME 13, NUMBER 2, PAGES 147-155

**Equilibrium and Pareto-optimality in noisy discrete duels with an
arbitrary number of actions**

L. N. Positselskaya

Abstract

View as HTML
View as gif image

We study a nonzero-sum game of two players that is
a generalization of the antagonistic noisy duel of discrete type.
The game is considered from the point of view of various criteria of
optimality.
We prove the existence of $\epsilon $-equilibrium
situations and show that the $\epsilon $-equilibrium
strategies that we found are $\epsilon $-maxmin.
Conditions under which the equilibrium plays are Pareto-optimal are
given.

Location: http://mech.math.msu.su/~fpm/eng/k07/k072/k07206h.htm

Last modified: May 23, 2007