FUNDAMENTALNAYA
I PRIKLADNAYA MATEMATIKA

(FUNDAMENTAL AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS)

2002, VOLUME 8, NUMBER 4, PAGES 1111-1128

**Equilibrium and Pareto-optimality in noisy non-zero sum discrete duel**

L. N. Positselskaya

Abstract

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We study a non-zero sum game which is a generalization of
the antagonistic noisy one-versus-one duel.
Equilibrium and $$e-equilibrium
points are presented in explicit form.
It is shown that the $$e-equilibrium
strategies of both players coincide
with their $$e-maxmin strategies.
We give the conditions under which the equilibrium strategy is
a maxmin strategy.
Pareto optimal games are investigated.

All articles are
published in Russian.

Location: http://mech.math.msu.su/~fpm/eng/k02/k024/k02413h.htm

Last modified: April 10, 2003