FUNDAMENTALNAYA
I PRIKLADNAYA MATEMATIKA
(FUNDAMENTAL AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS)
2002, VOLUME 8, NUMBER 4, PAGES 1111-1128
L. N. Positselskaya
Abstract
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We study a non-zero sum game which is a generalization of
the antagonistic noisy one-versus-one duel. Equilibrium
and $\varepsilon$ -equilibrium
points are presented in explicit form.
It is shown that the $\varepsilon$ -equilibrium strategies of both
players coincide with their $\varepsilon$ -maxmin strategies. We give
the conditions under which the equilibrium strategy is a maxmin strategy.
Pareto optimal games are investigated.
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Last modified: April 10, 2003